

## Message Text

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USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY MADRID

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USCINCEUR

USNMR SHAPE

USLOSACLANT

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GENEVA FOR CSCE DEL

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SECRETARY SCHLESINGER'S STATEMENT FOR  
RECORD WHICH WAS DISTRIBUTED TO SYG, DPC DELEGATIONS AND  
CHAIRMAN, MC ON DECEMBER 10. BEGIN TEXT:

### 1. MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE

IT IS HARDLY NECESSARY AT THE OUTSET OF THIS STATEMENT TO RECALL  
THAT ALL OF OUR COUNTRIES FACE A NUMBER OF SEVERE ECONOMIC  
PROBLEMS, NOW AND IN THE FUTURE. AT THE SAME TIME, WE BEAR THE HEAVY  
RESPONSIBILITY OF ENSURING THAT OUR DEFENSE EFFORTS REMAIN ADEQUATE  
FOR DETERRENCE IN AN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT THAT MAY BE GROW-  
ING INCREASINGLY UNSTABLE.

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### 1. CAPABILITIES OF THE WARSAW PACT

THE GROUND FOR CONTINUING OUR EFFORTS ARE UNPLEASANTLY EVIDENT.  
THE CAPABILITIES OF THE WARSAW PACT NATIONS, IN GENERAL, CONTINUE TO

EXPAND. WE EXPECT TO SEE THE SOVIET UNION BEGIN TO DEPLOY HER NEW FAMILY OF LARGE, MIRVED MISSILES IN THE COMING YEAR; COMPLETE DEPLOYMENT COULD OCCUR BY 1982. THE IMPROVEMENT IN WARSAW PACT GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES ALSO CONTINUES. HOWEVER, THIS GROWTH IS NOT AT SUCH A RATE AS TO OUT-DISTANCE NATO CAPABILITIES BY A WIDE MARGIN.

IN MANY RESPECTS, THE PACT NATIONS ARE JUST NOW BEGINNING TO CLOSE SOME WIDE GAPS IN CAPABILITIES, AS IN ASW, AND THEIR FORCES CONTINUE TO SHOW WEAKNESSES AND LIMITATIONS WHICH NATO SHOULD RECOGNIZE AND BE PREPARED TO EXPLOIT. THEY INCLUDE CONTINUED QUALITATIVE DEFICIENCIES IN THEIR NAVAL FORCES, IN THEIR LOGISTIC SUPPORT, AND IN SOME OF THEIR EQUIPMENT.

## 2. THE SITUATION IN NATO

IT IS NO SECRET THAT WE, TOO, HAVE OUR PROBLEMS. NONETHELESS, A STALWART CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY IS NOT BEYOND OUR GRASP. WE SHOULD NOT PRETEND, I AGREE, THAT A SATISFACTORY CONVENTIONAL BALANCE EXISTS IN EUROPE TODAY. BUT WE ARE NOT HOPELESSLY OUTCLASSED. NATO CONTINUES TO OUTSPEND THE PACT FOR DEFENSE, AND WE HAVE NO REASON TO APOLOGIZE FOR OUR CAPABILITIES. THE THREAT IS SIGNIFICANT, BUT IT IS ONE THAT WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO HANDLE--AND HENCE DETER.

SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENTS HAVE BEEN AND CONTINUE TO BE MADE IN OUR FORCES, AND COMBAT CAPABILITIES HAVE INCREASED IN IMPORTANT AREAS. IF THESE EFFORTS CONTINUE AND ARE SHARPLY FOCUSED, THERE IS NO REASON WHY NATO CANNOT KEEP PACE WITH THE PACT AND MAINTAIN THE BALANCE OF POWER SO NECESSARY TO DETERRENCE. TO DO ITS PART, THE UNITED STATES IS INCREASING THE COMBAT CAPABILITIES OF ITS FORCES IN EUROPE AND PROVIDING FOR A MORE FLEXIBLE DEPLOYMENT AND COMMITMENT OF ITS UNITS.

WHETHER, IN FACT, THESE JOINT EFFORTS CAN BE SUSTAINED YEAR AFTER YEAR IS ANOTHER MATTER. IN PERIODS OF APPARENT STABILITY AND NO SECRET

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IMMINENT WAR, DEMOCRACIES HAVE TENDED TO DISARM, TO LET THEIR MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS WITHER AWAY--ONLY TO REARM IN GREAT HASTE, AT GREAT COST, AND WITH GREAT RISK AFTER THE WAR CLOUDS HAVE FILLED THE HORIZON AGAIN. BUT THE FEAST AND FAMINE APPROACH TO DEFENSE IS NO LONGER PRACTICAL (IF IT EVER WAS) IN AN AGE OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY AND SCARCE MANPOWER.

WE CANNOT CUT OUR FORCES ANY FURTHER; NEITHER CAN WE REDUCE THEIR READINESS WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING THE PROFESSIONAL QUALITY OF OUR SERVICEMEN AND WOMEN. NOR CAN WE SIMPLY CONTINUE ON AN INDIVIDUAL NATIONAL BASIS TO MAINTAIN SUCH A BROAD RANGE OF EQUIPMENT AND FUNCTIONS SO THAT, AS GENERAL STEINHOFF HAS REMINDED US, NATO COMES TO RESEMBLE A MILITARY MUSEUM. WE MUST BOTH ECONOMIZE AND CONCENTRATE OUR EFFORTS AND WORK TOGETHER ON A WIDER RANGE

OF COOPERATIVE TASKS THAN WE'VE HAD TO IN THE PAST.

### 3. THE U.S. APPROACH TO GUIDANCE

IT IS AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND THAT WE HAVE REQUESTED THE DEFINITION OF A LONG-RANGE DEFENSE CONCEPT FOR PLANNING WITHIN THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE. IN DOING SO, WE DO NOT PROPOSE TO CHANGE NATO'S AGREED MILITARY STRATEGY. INSTEAD, WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE NATO ESTABLISH A SET OF OBJECTIVES THAT ARE FIRM BUT HAVE THE FLEXIBILITY TO ABSORB POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE.

WE HAVE TRIED TO EMBODY SUCH A CONCEPT IN THE U.S. DRAFT OF MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE. OUR PAPER PLACES CONSIDERABLE WEIGHT ON IMPROVING OUR CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES BECAUSE IT IS IN THIS AREA THAT NATO, HISTORICALLY, HAS BEEN THE WEAKEST. WHILE OUR TACTICAL NUCLEAR FORCES REQUIRE IMPROVEMENT, THEY REMAIN SUPERIOR IN MANY WAYS TO THOSE OF THE PACT. FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE--AS A RESULT OF THE AGREEMENT IN-PRINCIPLE AT VALDIVOSTOK--STRATEGIC EQUALITY WILL BE MAINTAINED. THAT LEAVES THE DEFICIT IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES AS THE MOST SERIOUS PROBLEM OF THE ALLIANCE AND THE PLACE WHERE WE SHOULD INVEST THE BULK OF OUR SCARCE RESOURCES.

NATO'S PRINCIPAL TASK HERE IS TO MAINTAIN THE FORCE LEVELS WE NOW HAVE, AND TO MODERNIZE THEM ON A PRIORITY BASIS TO MEET THE THREAT. THE UNITED STATES, FOR ITS PART, INTENDS TO MAINTAIN ITS MILITARY STRENGTH IN EUROPE. IN ADDITION, GIVEN THE IMPROVEMENTS WE HAVE ACHIEVED IN STRATEGIC MOBILITY, DEMONSTRATED IN THE REFORGER SECRET

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AND CRESTED CAP EXERCISES, WE WILL CONTINUE TO PLAN FOR THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT TO EUROPE OF OUR FORCES IN THE UNITED STATES. STILL FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS IN OUR STRATEGIC MOBILITY FORCES WILL PERMIT US TO SPEED UP THESE DEPLOYMENTS EVEN MORE.

THE MAIN OBJECTIVES OF THE U.S. DRAFT GUIDANCE ARE SEVEN IN NUMBER.

--TO ESTABLISH A LONG RANGE DEFENSE CONCEPT THAT WILL PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR A DECLARATORY STATEMENT THAT HAS APPEAL AND MEANING TO PUBLICS AND PARLIAMENTS ALIKE , AND THAT SETS A POSITIVE TONE FOR THE ALLIANCE.

--TO PROVIDE BROAD DIRECTION TO MEMBER COUNTRIES AS WELL AS TO NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES.

--TO EMPHASIZE THE FORCES THAT COUNTRIES HAVE PROVIDED AND MAINTAINED AS THE BASIS FOR FURTHER PLANNING--AND THAT INCLUDES ALL FORCES, NOT JUST THOSE FORMALLY COMMITTED TO THE ALLIANCE.

--TO ENSURE THAT THE MODERNIZATION OF THE FORCES CONTINUES AND THAT THE REAL RESOURCE INCREASES ACHIEVED OVER THE LAST

SEVERAL YEARS ARE MAINTAINED.

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USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY MADRID

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--TO ACHIEVE ADDITIONAL EFFECTIVENESS WITH PRESENT RESOURCE LEVELS, ESPECIALLY THROUGH OPERATIONAL PLANNING FOR THE MORE FLEXIBLE USE OF FORCES, RATIONALIZATION OF FUNCTIONS ACROSS COUNTRIES, AND STANDARDIZATION--ALL OF WHICH REQUIRE GREATER COOPERATION WITHIN THE ALLIANCE.

--TO ATTAIN A LOGISTIC CAPABILITY WHICH CAN OUTLAST THAT WHICH THE PACT CAN HASTILY ASSEMBLE--NOT IN ORDER TO FIGHT A LONG WAR, BUT IN ORDER TO DETER WAR FROM BREAKING OUT IN THE FIRST PLACE.

--TO PROVIDE PRIORITIES THAT ARE SPECIFIC AND FEW, WITH RESOURCE GUIDANCE FOR PLANNING THAT IS REALISTIC AND TAKES INTO ACCOUNT BOTH THE FORCES AND THE PLANS OF MEMBER COUNTRIES.

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FOR THESE REASONS, WE ASK THAT THE U.S. DRAFT (AT LEAST IN OUT-LINE) BE USED AS THE FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH THE GUIDANCE IS FORMULATED.

WE ARE NOT WEDDED TO THE WORDS, ALTHOUGH WE ARE TO MANY OF THE CONCEPTS. WE ARE OPEN TO ADDITIONS TO AND DELETIONS FROM THE BASIC DRAFT. THE IMPORTANT GOAL, HOWEVER, IS TO AGREE ON A CONCEPT. THIS IS THE CRUCIAL FIRST STEP. THEREAFTER, WE CAN PROCEED DELIBERATELY TO WORK OUR PLANS AND PROGRAMS WITHIN ITS FRAMEWORK, WHILE MEMBER COUNTRIES CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN AND IMPROVE THEIR FORCES.

## II. THE NUNN AMENDMENT

IT IS APPROPRIATE, AS COROLLARY TO THE ISSUE OF MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE, TO DISCUSS THE IMPLICATIONS OF SENATOR NUNN'S AMENDMENT TO THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1975. THIS CONGRESSIONAL INITIATIVE PROVIDES AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE UNITED STATES AND NATO TO IMPROVE THEIR COMBAT CAPABILITIES AND MAKE THE MOST EFFICIENT USE OF EXISTING DEFENSE RESOURCES. WE INTEND TO SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY.

### 1. INCREASED COMBAT POWER

THE WORDING OF THE AMENDMENT INDICATES THAT THE CONGRESS IS SERIOUS IN WANTING THE UNITED STATES TO:

--IMPROVE ITS FORCES THROUGH INCREASES IN THE SO-CALLED "TEETH-TO-TAIL" RATIO OF U.S. CONVENTIONAL UNITS IN EUROPE;

--TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE ECONOMIES WHICH COULD RESULT FROM STANDARDIZATION;

--RE-EXAMINE THE OVERALL CONCEPT AND POSTURE FOR THE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

I REGARD THE NUNN AMENDMENT AS A USEFUL MEANS BY WHICH TO ADVANCE IMAGINATIVE PROPOSALS AND ACHIEVE SECURITY FOR THE ALLIANCE. IN CONFORMING WITH IT, WE EXPECT TO ADD THE EQUIVALENT OF AT LEAST TWO COMBAT BRIGADES AND SELECTED SMALLER UNITS IN GERMANY. THE OVERALL EFFECT, WHEN PLANS ARE COMPLETED, WILL BE  
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A SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN AMERICAN COMBAT CAPABILITY IN EUROPE AND THE RETURN OF TWO-THIRDS OF A DIVISION WHICH WAS WITHDRAWN IN 1968.

IN ADDITION, WE ARE EXAMINING THE POSSIBILITIES OF DEPLOYING ADDITIONAL AIR UNITS TO EUROPE. THESE UNITS ARE OVER AND ABOVE THE SEVEN TACTICAL FIGHTER SQUADRONS AND ONE RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON THAT WE HAVE EARMARKED FOR SACEUR'S STRATEGIC RESERVE SINCE OUR LAST DPC MEETING. WE ARE ALSO CONSIDERING VARIOUS POSSIBLE TRADE-OFFS BETWEEN DIFFERENT TYPES OF AIRCRAFT SO AS TO INCREASE AIR COMBAT CAPABILITY. THIS RESTRUCTURING HAS IMPLICATIONS FOR MBFR AND MUST BE CAREFULLY ORCHESTRATED TO INSURE THAT THE POST-MBFR, POST-NUNN POSTURE IS THE BEST ATTAINABLE. THUS, WE

INVOLVED IN EXTENSIVE ANALYSIS AND REVIEW OF THE VARIOUS PROBLEMS OF IMPLEMENTING SELECTED NONCOMBAT TO COMBAT CONVERSIONS BOTH FOR GROUND UNITS AND TACTICAL AIR UNITS, TO INCLUDE EVALUATING THE IMPLICATIONS FOR MBFR OPTIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS. WE WILL, OF COURSE, CONSULT CLOSELY WITH NATO IN THE PROCESS.

## 2. STANDARDIZATION

IN RESPONDING TO THE STANDARDIZATION PART OF THE NUNN AMENDMENT, BOTH THE NATO RATIONALIZATION POTENTIAL STUDY COMPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE OF NATIONAL ARMAMENTS DIRECTORS SHOULD BE OF ASSISTANCE IN DEFINING THE PROBLEM AND ASSESSING PRIORITIES FOR DEVELOPING NATO STANDARDIZATION ACTIONS. THIS WILL HAVE AN IMPACT ON SUCH ISSUES AS THE F-104 REPLACEMENT, SHORADS, AEW (AWACS), ELECTRONIC WARFARE, COMMON RIFLE AND AMMUNITION, AND INTEROPERABILITY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT.

WITH STANDARDIZATION WE HOPE TO ACHIEVE GREATER OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS AT NO GREATER COST. BUT IT WILL REQUIRE THE ATTENTION OF EACH MINISTER OF DEFENSE. BOTH SACEUR AND SACLANT HAVE IDENTIFIED AREAS OF IMPROVED CAPABILITY THAT COULD RESULT FROM HAVING STANDARDIZED/INTEROPERABLE EQUIPMENT. STANDARDIZATION CAN BE OF REAL AND PROMISING WAY BY WHICH NATO COUNTRIES CAN ENHANCE THE COMBAT CAPABILITY OF THEIR FORCE CONTRIBUTIONS.

## 3. TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

IN DISCUSSING THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ASPECT OF THE NUNN AMENDMENT  
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IT BECOMES CLEAR THAT THE CREDIBILITY OF THE WAR FIGHTING CAPABILITY OF THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES REMAINS A BASIC AND ESSENTIAL CONDITION TO OUR CONCEPT OF DETERRENCE. ALTHOUGH NATO'S FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE AGAINST CONVENTIONAL ATTACK UNDER THE ALLIANCE'S AGREED STRATEGY SHOULD BE ITS CONVENTIONAL FORCES, THE STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL NUCLEAR FORCES CONTRIBUTE GREATLY TO DETERRENCE OF BOTH CONVENTIONAL NUCLEAR ATTACKS. DETERRENCE OF ANY LEVEL AGGRESSION IS, AND MUST CONTINUE TO BE, THE BACKBONE OF ALLIANCE DOCTRINE IN DEFENSE OF WESTERN EUROPE. THUS, WE MUST NOT ONLY CONTINUE TO PLACE EMPHASIS ON HAVING A STALWART CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY; WE MUST ALSO ENSURE THAT OUR NUCLEAR FORCES REMAIN FULLY READY SO AS TO MAINTAIN THE BASIC TRIAD OF NATO DETERRENT FORCES.

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USMISSION GENEVA

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AS YOU KNOW, WE ARE IN THE PROCESS OF MAKING QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS TO POSEIDON AND SUCH STRATEGIC WEAPONS AS MINUTEMAN III WHILE CONTINUING DEVELOPMENT OF TRIDENT AND THE B-1 BOMBER-- THE STRATEGIC LEG OF THE TRIAD. IN ADDITION, WE ARE REVIEWING OUT TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE AND POSTURE, PURSUANT TO THE NUNN AMENDMENT. THIS REVIEW WILL CERTAINLY NOT DE-EMPHASIZE THE ROLE OF THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WE WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE NATO TRIAD. FOR INSTANCE, WE ARE PLANNING TO STATIONS IN EUROPE A LARGER NUMBER OF LANCE MISSILES THAN PREVIOUSLY ANNOUNCED-- WHICH WILL STRENGTHEN OUR NUCLEAR FORCES. WHILE SOME ADJUSTMENTS MAY BE NECESSARY IN THE SIZE AND LOCATIONS OF THE STOCKPILE IN EUROPE, THESE WILL BE MADE IN A WAY AS TO ENHANCE THE DETERRENT VALUE OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES.

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FROM ANOTHER POINT OF VIEW, WE HAVE, OVER THE YEARS TENDED TO ALLOW TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES TO DRIVE DOCTRINE. WE HAVE ACCEPTED THIS METHOD IN AN ERA OF PLENTY. IT HAS NOW BECOME EVIDENT, THAT IN ADDITION TO CONGRESSIONAL CONCERN OVER OUR OVERSEAS DEPLOYMENT POLICIES, THERE IS RELUCTANCE TO APPROVE ANY NEW INITIATIVES RELATED TO THE PROCUREMENT OF NEW OR IMPROVED NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS WITH OUT SOUND JUSTIFICATION. ACCORDINGLY, WE FORESEE THE FORTHCOMING NPG STUDY OF THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF NEW WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY AS PROVIDING VALUABLE INSIGHTS INTO POSSIBLE FUTURE WEAPONS REQUIREMENTS FOR NATO. SUCH EXAMINATION WOULD, OF COURSE, BE CLOSELY LINKED TO BOTH CURRENT DOCTRINE AND ANY REFINEMENTS OF DOCTRINE THAT WE MIGHT JOINTLY DEVELOP IN THE FUTURE.

OUR STOCKPILE REEVALUATION WILL ALSO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT OUR CONCERN, WHICH I KNOW ALL OF YOU SHARE, ABOUT THE SECURITY OF REMOTE, EXPOSED STORAGE SITES CONTAINING NUCLEAR WARHEADS. THE RISE OF TERRORISM REQUIRES THAT WE LOOK AGAIN AT THE SECURITY OF THESE SITES AND WHERE APPROPRIATE TAKE PRUDENT CORRECTIVE ACTIONS.

WE ARE PREPARED TO CONSULT FULLY WITH THE ALLIANCE AND WITH INDIVIDUAL GOVERNMENTS IN CONNECTION WITH THE REPORTS TO BE SUBMITTED TO THE CONGRESS PURSUANT TO THE NUNN AMENDMENT. AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE ASKED THE MILITARY COMMITTEE TO PROVIDE A COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT OF VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPON DEPLOYMENTS. WE HAVE ALSO INVITED POLITICAL VIEWS ON THESE MILITARY ASSESSMENTS TO BE PROVIDED THROUGH NPG AT THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE LEVEL.

### III. SPAIN

FINALLY, AS IN THE PAST, I ASK MY COLLEAGUES IN THIS FORUM TO CONSIDER THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF SPAIN TO THE COMMON DEFENSE. BY AGREEMENT WITH SPAIN THE U.S. HAS ACCESS, TRANSIT, STATIONING, AND STORAGE RIGHTS IN THAT COUNTRY PLUS THE RIGHT TO USE BASES THERE WHICH ARE OF MAJOR STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE TO THE ALLIANCE BOTH IN PEACETIME AND DURING PERIODS OF TENSION, CRISIS, AND WAR. THIS AGREEMENT EXPIRES NEXT SEPTEMBER, AND THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT RENEWAL WILL BE CONTINGENT UPON REACHING A SATISFACTORY POLITICAL ARRANGEMENT WHICH MORE CLOSELY ALIGNS SPAIN WITH OUR MUTUAL SECURITY SYSTEM. THE SPANISH ARE SEEKING  
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RECOGNITION ON THEIR ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEFENSE OF WESTERN EUROPE. THEY ARE ALSO FACING A PERIOD OF POLITICAL TRANSITION DURING WHICH SUPPORT BY SPAIN'S EUROPEAN NEIGHBORS WILL BE A LIKELY REQUISITE TO THE ORDERLY DEVELOPMENT OF MORE DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS. I THEREFORE URGE AGAIN THAT EACH OF THE ALLIES TAKE A FRESH LOOK AT THE SPANISH CONTRIBUTION AND EXPLORE A BROAD RANGE OF POTENTIAL ACTIVITIES, PARTICULARLY IN THE SPHERE OF MILITARY COOPERATION.

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USNMR SHAPE

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